

DDCI ADDRESS TO
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

18 OCTOBER 1971

DEAR GENERAL MCPHERSON, GENTLEMEN:

A FORMER SENATOR WHO KNEW A GREAT DEAL ABOUT U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS BUT NEVER DISCUSSED THEM--ONCE EXPLAINED TO HIS CONSTITUENTS THAT IN AN OPEN SOCIETY LIKE OURS, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO INFORM THE PUBLIC WITHOUT INFORMING OUR ENEMIES, WHO MAKE IT A PRACTICE TO READ OUR NEWSPAPERS VERY CAREFULLY.

THAT IS WHY I WELCOME OPPORTUNITIES LIKE THIS INVITATION TODAY TO SPEAK TO YOU IN CLOSED FORUM, PARTICULARLY ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY FORMULATION.

OUR CRITICS ARE NEITHER HAMPERED BY SECURITY REGULATIONS, NOR RESTRAINED BY FEAR THAT WE MIGHT REFUTE THEM WITH FACTS. IF WE WERE TO BEGIN TO REPLY WITH SOME RELATIVELY HARMLESS ANSWERS, THE QUESTION OF JUST WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE AND SHUT UP MIGHT BE EVEN MORE DAMAGING THAN THE ORIGINAL CRITICISM, SO WE JUST HAVE TO LIVE WITH SOME HIGHLY IMAGINATIVE DESCRIPTIONS OF OUR WORK.

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WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, IT IS VITAL THAT WE ALL HAVE A CLEAR AND COMPREHENSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF THE EXACT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE REST OF THE GOVERNMENT--SPECIFICALLY, HOW INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTS THE POLICY-MAKER, AND HOW THE POLICY-MAKER CONTROLS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.


THE FACT THAT YOU GENTLEMEN HAVE BEEN CHOSEN TO ATTEND THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE IDENTIFIES YOU AS OFFICERS WHO ARE GOING TO BE DOING A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF JOINT STAFF AND JOINT COMMITTEE WORK IN YOUR FUTURE CAREER ASSIGNMENTS. A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF YOUR DUTIES WILL INVOLVE SPECIAL TASK FORCES AND INTER-AGENCY GROUPS WHERE YOU WILL BE WORKING WITH--AND POSSIBLY EVEN FOR--THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

ACCORDINGLY, I THINK IT WILL BE HELPFUL TO YOU, TO YOUR SERVICES, AND TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ITSELF, TO DISCUSS THE CONCEPT, THE ORGANIZATION, AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS IN OUR GOVERNMENT WHICH WORK TOGETHER TO PRODUCE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

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
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FIRST, I AM GOING TO DISCUSS THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, THEN THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE POLICY-MAKERS--INCLUDING CIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE CURRENT DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR U.S. POLICY. NEXT I WILL DISCUSS THE CONTROLS UNDER WHICH INTELLIGENCE OPERATES, AND CONCLUDE BY DESCRIBING BRIEFLY THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION ABOUT THE TERM "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY," WHICH IS SIMPLY A HANDY WAY OF REFERRING TO ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT WHICH ARE CONCERNED WITH COLLECTING, ANALYZING, AND DISSEMINATING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE. IT IS A FRAMEWORK--FORMALIZED IN THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD--WITHIN WHICH ALL OF THESE COMPONENTS CAN WORK TOGETHER.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 DID NOT CREATE THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. WE HAD INTELLIGENCE AGENTS--AND GOOD ONES, TOO--IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. BEFORE THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS ESTABLISHED, OUR GOVERNMENT WAS GETTING INTELLIGENCE FROM THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND THE FBI, AND THESE SAME ORGANIZATIONS ARE STILL PROVIDING IT.



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THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 WAS WRITTEN AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF PEARL HARBOR. ALL OF THE INVESTIGATIONS OF THAT BLACK DAY SHOWED THAT THE NECESSARY INTELLIGENCE WAS THERE. IT HAD BEEN GATHERED, BUT THE FAILURE WAS THAT ALL OF THE BITS AND PIECES IN THE HANDS OF VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT WERE NOT PUT TOGETHER, EVALUATED, COORDINATED, AND DISSEMINATED IN TIME TO THE PEOPLE WHO NEEDED THE INFORMATION IN ORDER TO TAKE PROPER ACTION.

THE OBVIOUS REMEDY WAS TO ENSURE THAT OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WORK TOGETHER, EXCHANGE AND COMPARE INFORMATION, AND PROVIDE THE MEN WHO HAVE TO MAKE THE DECISIONS WITH THE BEST COMBINED, AGREED INTELLIGENCE THAT IS AVAILABLE. IN A NUTSHELL, THIS IS THE DEFINITION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, AND THE CONCEPT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

WHEN THE ARMED SERVICES, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND CIA, AND THE FBI ARE ALL ENGAGED IN COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE, ANY GOOD BUREAUCRAT CAN TELL YOU THAT THERE ARE TWO GREAT DANGERS:

THE FIRST AND GREATEST IS THAT SOME VITAL ASSIGNMENT WILL FALL BETWEEN THE STOOLS--THAT EACH

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AGENCY WILL THINK SOMEBODY ELSE HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY.

THE OTHER DANGER IS DUPLICATION OF EFFORT--AND THIS IS NOT MERELY A QUESTION OF EXTRAVAGANCE. IN THE COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE, UNCOORDINATED EFFORTS AGAINST THE SAME TARGET CAN LEAD TO DISASTERS.

TO COPE WITH BOTH OF THESE PITFALLS--TO ENSURE ENOUGH COORDINATION SO THAT THERE WILL BE NEITHER IMPORTANT GAPS NOR UNDESIRABLE DUPLICATION--THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 AND SUBSEQUENT PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS GAVE THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TWO RESPONSIBILITIES. HE IS BY LAW THE HEAD OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WHICH HAS THE STATUTORY FUNCTION OF PRODUCING COORDINATED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. HE IS ALSO, BY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE, THE PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER OF THE GOVERNMENT. HE GUIDES AND COORDINATES ALL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES--ANYWHERE IN THE GOVERNMENT--RELATING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND HE ACTS AS PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT.

TURNING TO THE COMPOSITION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, THE FIRST ELEMENT MOST PEOPLE THINK OF IN THIS CONTEXT IS THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WHICH

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OPERATES UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

SECOND, THERE IS THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WHICH REPORTS TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND-- THROUGH THE JOINT CHIEFS--TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. THE INTELLIGENCE UNITS OF THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE CONTINUE TO SERVE THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE RESPECTIVE SERVICES. WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE THREE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS ARE CLOSELY COORDINATED BY THE DIRECTOR OF DIA.

THERE IS AN INTELLIGENCE COMPONENT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE--THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH-- WHICH SERVES THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND HIS POLICY PLANNERS. ALL OF OUR DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL ARE INTELLIGENCE GATHERERS IN A SENSE, BUT THERE IS ALSO A SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT FOR MEN WHO APPLY THEMSELVES PROFESSIONALLY TO THE ANALYSIS OF THAT INFORMATION, AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION HAS AN INTELLIGENCE COMPONENT WITH A SPECIALIZED CHARTER DEVOTED TO THE VITAL FIELD OF INFORMATION ABOUT NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENTS.

THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION IS CONCERNED PRIMARILY WITH INTERNAL SECURITY, BUT THE CONNECTION BETWEEN INTERNAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IS

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OBVIOUS, SO THE FBI, TOO, IS A MEMBER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THE FBI AND THE CIA WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER, BECAUSE THEY BOTH MUST CONTEND WITH NETWORKS OF FOREIGN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS WHOSE AGENTS MOVE BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES WITH LITTLE REGARD FOR BOUNDARIES OR NATIONALITIES. IT SHOULD BE STRESSED HERE THAT BY LAW CIA HAS NO DOMESTIC INTERNAL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY AND IS FORBIDDEN BY LAW TO REPORT ON U.S. CITIZENS.


THESE AGENCIES, THEN, EXCEPT FOR THE NSA WHICH IS IN A UNIQUE CATEGORY, ARE THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY--CIA, DIA AND THE SERVICE COMPONENTS, STATE, AEC, AND THE FBI.

ROUNDING OUT THE PICTURE OF THE COMMUNITY, ARE A NUMBER OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ASSETS--ACTIVITIES WHICH SERVE THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN ANY PARTICULAR DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY. ONE AGENCY MAY MANAGE THEM, AND EVEN PROVIDE MOST OF THE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT, BUT THEY ACTUALLY OPERATE DIRECTLY FOR THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

THE OLDEST AND LARGEST OF THESE IS THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, WHICH IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, [REDACTED]

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ANOTHER NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ASSET IS THE NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER, WHICH DEALS WITH INTELLIGENCE ACQUIRED BY PHOTOGRAPHIC MEANS, EXAMINING THE FILMS IN DETAIL, AND INTERPRETING WHAT IS SEEN.

I NEED ONLY MENTION THE DETECTION OF THE SOVIET MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES IN CUBA IN OCTOBER 1962, TO SHOW HOW ESSENTIAL NPIC IS TO OUR INTELLIGENCE EFFORT.

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A FOURTH SUCH NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ASSET IS THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES, WHICH I WILL DISCUSS A BIT LATER.

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NOW, THESE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND ORGANIZATIONS I HAVE JUST ENUMERATED ARE TIED TOGETHER, FOR GUIDANCE PURPOSES, BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD, WHICH WE OFTEN REFER TO AS USIB.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, BY PRESIDENTIAL DESIGNATION, IS THE CHAIRMAN OF USIB--AND THIS, BY THE WAY, IS ONE PLACE WHERE THE DIRECTOR'S TWO JOBS--OR HIS "TWO HATS"--ARE VERY CAREFULLY DIFFERENTIATED. WHEN HE CHAIRS THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD, HE IS THERE AS THE PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, NOT AS THE HEAD OF CIA. USIB ACTS ON AND APPROVES THE AGREED, COORDINATED JUDGMENTS OF THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND IT WOULD NOT BE PROPER OR EFFECTIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR SIMULTANEOUSLY TO CHAIR THE MEETING AND TO PRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. FOR THIS REASON, CIA HAS SEPARATE REPRESENTATION ON THE BOARD IN THE PERSON OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE OTHER PRINCIPALS ARE:

THE STATE DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH;

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THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY;
THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY;
THE ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER OF THE AEC; AND
THE ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI.

SINCE THE CONSOLIDATION OF INTELLIGENCE UNDER DIA IN THE PENTAGON, THE INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS OF THE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE ATTEND AND PARTICIPATE, BUT AS OBSERVERS RATHER THAN AS OFFICIAL MEMBERS OF USIB. THEY RETAIN THE RIGHT, AND IN FACT THE DUTY, TO EXPRESS ANY DISSENT THEY MAY HAVE ON MATTERS UNDER DISCUSSION. IF YOU HAVE SEEN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, WITH THEIR FOOTNOTES, YOU KNOW THAT THIS IS A RIGHT THEY DO NOT HESITATE TO EXERCISE.

USIB MEETS REGULARLY ONCE A WEEK--SOMETIMES MORE OFTEN. IT IS CONCERNED WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF MATTERS, BUT I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT USIB OPERATES AS AN ADVISORY BODY TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THERE ARE THREE PRINCIPAL FUNCTIONS.

FIRST, THE USIB ESTABLISHES--AND PERIODICALLY REVIEWS--THE NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR THE GUIDANCE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN CHOOSING INTELLIGENCE TARGETS, AND IN RECOMMENDING ASSIGNMENT OF ASSETS TO COVER THOSE TARGETS.

-10-

SECOND, THE USIB CONTINUOUSLY REVIEWS OUR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY ARE IN ACCORD WITH THOSE PRIORITIES, AND TO MAKE SURE THAT WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO CLOSE IMPORTANT GAPS, AND TO AVOID UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION. PLEASE NOTE THAT I HAVE MODIFIED THE WORD "DUPLICATION" EACH TIME I HAVE USED IT. WHEN WE ARE TRYING TO GET HOLD OF THE OTHER FELLOW'S SECRETS IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY, A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF DUPLICATION IS NOT ONLY DESIRABLE, BUT EVEN MANDATORY FOR THE SAKE OF CONFIRMATION.


THIRD, THE USIB REVIEWS IN DRAFT FORM AND IN GREAT DETAIL THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES WHICH THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SUBMITS TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE ACTUAL WORK OF DRAFTING AND RE-WORKING THESE PAPERS IS GENERALLY DONE IN THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES, WHICH IS A PART OF CIA, BUT THE FINAL PRODUCT IS A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, AND MUST, THEREFORE, REFLECT THE CONSIDERED JUDGMENT OF THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THIS IS ENSURED THROUGH THE PARTICIPATION

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


OF ALL APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS OF THE COMMUNITY, THROUGH THE CONTRIBUTION OF FACTS AND JUDGMENTS, IN THE REVIS-
ING OF THE PAPERS IN DRAFT, AND BY THE USIB REVIEW OF THE FINAL PRODUCT. THE OBJECTIVE OF EACH ESTIMATE IS A CAREFUL AND THOUGHTFUL SET OF JUDGMENTS WHICH WILL BE OF THE GREATEST POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO THE POLICY-
MAKER.

I WANT TO STRESS THAT THE MEN ENGAGED IN ARRIVING AT AN ESTIMATE ARE NOT STRIVING FOR UNANIMITY PER SE. IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE UNANIMITY BY OVER-
RIDING THE DISSENTING MINORITY, OR BY WATERING DOWN THE ESTIMATE TO THE LEAST COMMON DENOMINATOR--A NARROW AREA OF COMPLETE AGREEMENT BY THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. SUCH UNANIMITY, HOWEVER, WOULD BE A DIS-
SERVICE TO THE POLICY-MAKER AND THE PLANNER.

WHAT IS ASKED IS THAT THE DISSENTS SHALL BE BASED ON HONEST DIFFERENCES OF OPINION OVER HOW THE AVAILABLE FACTS ARE TO BE EVALUATED AND INTERPRETED--NOT ON PERSONAL CONVICTIONS, HUNCHES, OR PAROCHIAL INTERESTS. WITHIN THIS FRAME OF REFERENCE, WE EN-
COURAGE WELL-FOUNDED DISSENTS.

THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES, WHICH I RE-
FERRED TO A BIT EARLIER, DESERVES SPECIAL MENTION. UNTIL THE BRITISH RECENTLY MOVED TO SET UP A SIMILAR



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GROUP, THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES WAS THE ONLY INSTITUTION OF ITS KIND IN ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WE KNOW OF. AS ESTABLISHED BY GENERAL BEDELL SMITH WHEN HE WAS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN 1950, IT IS A BODY OF SENIOR, KNOWLEDGEABLE MEN OF VARIED EXPERIENCE, WHO HAVE NO OTHER DUTY THAN TO STUDY AND SEEK ANSWERS TO THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY. THE BOARD IS COMPOSED OF ABOUT FIFTEEN MEN WITH EXTENSIVE BACKGROUNDS IN THE MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC, LEGAL, ACADEMIC, AND INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONS. THEIR SOLE FUNCTION IS TO HEAR AND CONSIDER EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT FROM THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THESE JUDGMENTS ARE THEN PRESENTED TO THE DIRECTOR AND TO USIB, AND NORMALLY HAVE GREAT WEIGHT IN THE ESTIMATES THE DIRECTOR SUBMITS TO THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISORS ON MATTERS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO NATIONAL SECURITY.

A WORD ABOUT THE NATIONAL ESTIMATES THEMSELVES. SINCE NOVEMBER 3RD OF 1950, WHEN THE FIRST NIE WAS ISSUED ON THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST ARMED ACTION IN THE PHILIPPINES DURING NOVEMBER, MORE THAN ELEVEN HUNDRED ESTIMATES HAVE BEEN PREPARED. THEIR SCOPE AND TIMEFRAME HAVE BECOME STEADILY MORE EXTENSIVE

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OVER THE YEARS, AND THE COMPLEXITY OF THEIR SUBJECTS HAS GROWN. SOME ESTIMATES STILL DEAL WITH THE OUTLOOK FOR INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES: THESE ARE USUALLY ABOUT COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE ALREADY BECOME HOT SPOTS, OR ARE LIKELY TO CAUSE SERIOUS CONCERN OVER THE NEXT TWO OR THREE YEARS. MANY NIEs, HOWEVER, NOW CONSIDER BROADER PROBLEMS AND TRENDS WHICH CUT ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES--FOR EXAMPLE, SOUTHEAST ASIA AFTER VIETNAM, SOVIET POLICIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN, OR THE POTENTIAL FOR REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA.

THE ESTIMATES ON SOVIET AND COMMUNIST CHINESE MILITARY MATTERS ARE A CASE ALL TO THEMSELVES. THESE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN BUILT ON A SOLID BASE OF HARD EVIDENCE AND HAVE LOOKED FURTHER AHEAD THAN MOST OTHER ESTIMATES--USUALLY FIVE YEARS. SINCE 1970, THEY HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE DETAILED AND COMPREHENSIVE THAN BEFORE--AND COMPLETE WITH TECHNICAL APPENDICES AND ALTERNATE INTERPRETATIONS OF KEY DATA. THE TIMING OF THESE MILITARY NIEs WILL CONTINUE TO BE KEYED TO THE PLANNING CYCLE FOR OUR U.S. DEFENSE FORCE LEVELS AND BUDGETS. PRESIDENT NIXON HAS CONGRATULATED THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE EXCELLENCE OF THE FIRST OF THESE MAJOR NEW MILITARY NATIONAL ESTIMATES, NIE 11-8-70, "SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK."

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YET ANOTHER TYPE, THE SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, OR SNIE, INCLUDES AD HOC PAPERS ON IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF THE MOMENT, SUCH AS THE EXPECTED REACTION TO SOME PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION BY THE U.S. THEREFORE, THE SNIES MAY GET INTO SOME RATHER SENSITIVE AREAS.

OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD ARE CARRIED ON BY COMMITTEES WITH SPECIALIZED FUNCTIONS. SOME OF THEM ARE REGULAR STANDING COMMITTEES, SUCH AS THE JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, WHICH FOLLOWS NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, FRANCE, COMMUNIST CHINA, AND OTHER COUNTRIES WITH THE POTENTIAL OF BECOMING NUCLEAR POWERS. A SIMILAR COMMITTEE, THE GUIDED MISSILE AND ASTRO-NAUTICS INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, CONCENTRATES ON FOREIGN SPACE AND MISSILE ACTIVITY.

THEN THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF AD HOC COMMITTEES TO DEAL WITH SPECIFIC CRISES OR RECURRENT HEADACHES--A BERLIN COMMITTEE, AN ARAB-ISRAELI COMMITTEE, A TAIWAN STRAIT COMMITTEE, TO GIVE YOU SOME EXAMPLES OUT OF THE PAST.

THE WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCENTRATES ON THE HIGHLY SPECIALIZED

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FIELD THAT WE CALL INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE. THERE IS LOCATED IN THE PENTAGON A FULLTIME ACTIVITY KNOWN AS THE NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER, WHICH IS STAFFED JOINTLY BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THE FUNCTION OF THE NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER IS TO MAINTAIN AN AROUND-THE-CLOCK INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WATCH FOR INDICATIONS OF FOREIGN PREPARATIONS TO ATTACK THE U.S., ITS FORCES OVERSEAS, OR ITS ALLIES. THIS CENTER AND THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES REPORT TO THE WATCH COMMITTEE ON INDICATIONS WHICH MAY BE SIGNIFICANT--OR ON THE ABSENCE OF ANY SIGNIFICANT INDICATORS. THE WATCH COMMITTEE HAS A REGULAR WEEKLY MEETING, TIMED SO THAT THE CONCLUSIONS WILL BE READY FOR THE WEEKLY USIB MEETING, BUT IN TIME OF CRISIS THE WATCH COMMITTEE MAY MEET ONE OR MORE TIMES A DAY.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, I WOULD LIKE TO DESCRIBE HOW THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MAKES ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE DECISION-MAKERS IN OUR GOVERNMENT.

LET ME SAY FIRST OF ALL THAT WHEN IT COMES TO DECISION-MAKING, IT IS A FIRMLY ESTABLISHED RULE THAT OUR ONLY ROLE IS ONE OF SUPPLYING OBJECTIVE, SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE. IT MAY BE HARD FACT, IT MAY BE AN INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION--THE BEST

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JUDGMENT OF THE SITUATION; OR IT MAY BE ESTIMATIVE--
AGAIN, A CONSIDERED JUDGMENT OF HOW THE SITUATION IS
LIKELY TO DEVELOP. THE INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS NEITHER
MAKE NOR ADVOCATE POLICY WHILE THEY ARE FUNCTIONING
AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
NOW, A MAN WHO SITS IN USIB AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
AN AGENCY WHICH HAS A RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLICY FOR-
MULATION MAY WELL LEAVE THE USIB CONFERENCE ROOM OUT
AT CIA HEADQUARTERS IN LANGLEY, GO BACK TO HIS OWN
OFFICE, AND ENGAGE IN A MEETING AT WHICH THE POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS OF HIS DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY ARE FOR-
MULATED. AS LONG AS HE IS SITTING IN USIB, HOWEVER,
HE IS NOT A POLICY-MAKER.

AS YOU CAN READILY UNDERSTAND, AN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE HAS NO VALUE, NO PURPOSE, AND NO FUTURE, IF
IT IS NOT BELIEVED BY THOSE IT SERVES.

THIS IS WHAT DICTATES THAT AN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE SHALL ONLY SUPPORT--NOT PARTICIPATE IN--THE
POLICY-MAKING PROCESS.

SUPPOSE THAT THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISERS
FACE A CHOICE BETWEEN COURSE A AND COURSE B: INTEL-
LIGENCE WILL ONLY PROVIDE THE FACTS--AND THE WHOLE

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RANGE OF KNOWN FACTS--RELEVANT TO THE CHOICE. INTELLIGENCE WILL NOT RECOMMEND ONE COURSE OR THE OTHER. THE MOMENT INTELLIGENCE ADVOCATES COURSE A, THE PROPONENTS OF COURSE B ARE GOING TO SUSPECT-- IF NOT BELIEVE--THAT INTELLIGENCE HAS RIGGED ITS REPORTING TO SUPPORT THAT ADVOCACY. CREDIBILITY GOES OUT THE WINDOW.

THE ESTIMATIVE FUNCTION, OF COURSE, INCLUDES CONTINGENCY PAPERS. THESE ARE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS, POSED BY THE POLICY-MAKERS, AS TO THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OR REACTIONS TO SPECIFIC PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION BY THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS INDEED THIN ICE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND I MUST ADMIT THAT THE RESPONSIVE CONCLUSIONS ARE SOMETIMES SO CLEAR-CUT AND SO DEFINITIVE THAT THEY ARE TANTAMOUNT TO TACIT POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS. A WEATHER FORECAST OF RAIN IS OBJECTIVE, BUT IT IS ALSO IN EFFECT A TACIT RECOMMENDATION TO TAKE A RAINCOAT.

THESE PAPERS ARE UNDERTAKEN, HOWEVER, AT THE SPECIFIC REQUEST OF THE POLICY-MAKER. THE CONCLUSIONS ARE BASED ON A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF ALL THE FACTS AVAILABLE. RIVAL ADVOCATES AMONG THE POLICY-MAKERS CAN ALWAYS CHECK WITH THEIR OWN INTELLIGENCE

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REPRESENTATIVES TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE QUESTION HAS BEEN GIVEN OBJECTIVE AND IMPARTIAL REVIEW IN THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS.

MY POINT IS THAT IF THERE IS CONTROVERSY OVER WHAT THE U.S. POLICY OR COURSE OF ACTION SHOULD BE, THE OPPOSING ADVOCATES MUST HAVE AN IMPARTIAL SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE INFORMATION WHICH ALL CAN TRUST. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CAN FURNISH THAT OBJECTIVE FOUNDATION, AND COMMAND THE NECESSARY CREDIBILITY ONLY IF IT NEVER ENGAGES IN ADVOCACY.

TO ILLUSTRATE THIS POINT I WOULD LIKE TO DESCRIBE IN SOME DETAIL HOW CIA PARTICIPATES IN THE U.S. POLICY-MAKING PROCESS. UNDER CURRENT PROCEDURES, THIS PROCESS STARTS WITH A NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM, OR NSSM.

THE NSSM ORIGINATES IN THE NSC STAFF UNDER DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, THE PRESIDENT'S ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, WHO STATES THE PROBLEM AND OUTLINES WHAT IS TO BE DONE, BY WHOM, AND WHEN.

THE BASIC DOCUMENT IS DRAFTED, USUALLY BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, IN THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP. ONE OF THESE, CALLED THE POLITICAL-MILITARY GROUP, DEALS WITH PRIMARILY MILITARY MATTERS. THERE ARE FIVE OTHERS BROKEN DOWN BY GEOGRAPHIC AREAS, WHICH ARE IDENTICAL WITH WHAT WERE CALLED INTERDEPARTMENTAL REGIONAL GROUPS IN THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION. THEY ARE CHAIRED BY THE APPROPRIATE

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE. THE CIA REPRESENTATIVE IS USUALLY THE APPROPRIATE DIVISION CHIEF FROM OUR OPERATING SIDE, THE DIRECTORATE OF PLANS, BUT HIS FUNCTION IS LIMITED TO INTELLIGENCE INPUT.

THE NSSM ITSELF STATES THE PROBLEM, LAYS OUT THE FACTS, AND THEN LISTS A SERIES OF OPTIONS, WITH PROS, CONS, AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES, BUT WITHOUT MAKING A FINAL RECOMMENDATION AMONG THE OPTIONS.

WHEN THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP IS SATISFIED WITH THE NSSM, IT IS FORWARDED FOR REVIEW AT A HIGHER LEVEL. IN THE CASE OF DEFENSE POLICY, IT GOES TO THE DEFENSE POLICY REVIEW GROUP, CHAIRED BY DR. KISSINGER AND COMPRISING THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS, THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS.

NSSMs WHICH ARE NOT PRIMARILY MILITARY GO TO THE NSC SENIOR REVIEW GROUP, ALSO CHAIRED BY DR. KISSINGER. THE DIRECTOR AND I ARE THE CIA REPRESENTATIVES, AND OUR ROLE IS LIMITED TO INTELLIGENCE INPUT; OTHER MEMBERS ARE SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES

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FROM STATE, DEFENSE, AND JOINT CHIEFS, AND THE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING. THE HEAD OF USIA USUALLY ATTENDS.

THE PAPER MAY SHUTTLE BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP AND THE REVIEW GROUP SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE IT IS CONSIDERED READY FOR PRESIDENTIAL CONSIDERATION. ULTIMATELY, IT COMES BEFORE THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AS A DOCUMENT STATING A PROBLEM AND EVALUATING ALL THE POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION. IT IS A POLICY DOCUMENT WHICH STOPS SHORT OF MAKING A RECOMMENDATION; THE DECISION IS UP TO THE PRESIDENT.

WHEN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS AROUND THE LONG OVAL TABLE IN THE CABINET ROOM, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS USUALLY SEATED ALL BY HIMSELF AT ONE END OF THE TABLE, MAY I REPEAT--AS AN ADVISOR. HE GENERALLY OPENS THE MEETING WITH A SHORT, CONCISE BRIEFING ON THE INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS OF THE SUBJECT UNDER CONSIDERATION.

NOW, THERE HAS BEEN, AS I SAID, AN INTELLIGENCE INPUT ALL THE WAY THROUGH, AT EVERY STAGE OF THE NSSM PROCESS. IT COMES NOT ONLY FROM THE CIA PEOPLE ON THE VARIOUS PANELS, BUT FROM THE DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS SUPPORTING THE REPRESENTATIVES

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OF THE OPERATING DEPARTMENTS SUCH AS DEFENSE AND STATE. IT CONTRIBUTES TO THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, AND TO THE EVALUATION OF THE VARIOUS OPTIONS.

THIS INTELLIGENCE INPUT, HOWEVER, IS ORIENTED TO POSSIBLE U.S. COURSES OF ACTION, AND IT IS SUBORDINATED TO A DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES.

THE DIRECTOR'S BRIEFING TO THE NSC, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS ORIENTED TO THE PROBLEM--NOT TO THE ANSWERS--AND I THINK IT IS RELEVANT TO OUR EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN DETACHMENT FROM POLICY THAT, WHILE WE ARE REPRESENTED IN THE NSSM PROCESS BY OUR OPERATING AND COLLECTION PEOPLE, THE DIRECTOR NORMALLY CALLS ON THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION SIDE, AND SPECIFICALLY THE OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, TO HELP IN THE PREPARATION OF HIS BRIEFING FOR THE NSC.

IN THE BACK-AND-FORTH DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWS, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE PARTICIPATES ONLY WHEN HE IS ASKED FOR HIS OPINION OR FOR SOME ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE DETAIL. THERE IS, OF COURSE, NOTHING LIKE A FINAL VOTE, AND THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION NORMALLY IS MADE KNOWN AT

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SOME LATER POINT IN A NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MEMORANDUM DIRECTING THE HEADS OF APPROPRIATE DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES TO TAKE SPECIFIC ACTIONS.

SO FAR, I HAVE BEEN DEALING WITH THE CONTENTION OF OUR CRITICS THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY--AND CIA IN PARTICULAR--SOMEHOW "MAKES" POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THERE REMAINS THE ALLEGATION THAT INTELLIGENCE OPERATES WITHOUT ANY CONTROLS, THAT IT MAKES AND IMPLEMENTS ITS OWN POLICY, SOMETIMES IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE PROFESSED POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

THERE IS ANOTHER SIDE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY: THE CONTROLS WHICH THE POLICY-MAKERS--THE ELECTED AUTHORITIES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT--HAVE AND EXERCISE OVER EVEN THE MOST SECRET OF OUR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

ESSENTIALLY, WE ARE NOW TALKING ABOUT FUNCTIONS WHICH, WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, ARE PECULIAR TO CIA. I WANT TO DISCUSS BRIEFLY WHERE WE GET OUR CHARTER FOR THESE ACTIVITIES, AND HOW THEY ARE GENERATED, PLANNED, ORGANIZED, AND CONTROLLED.

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THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 GAVE CIA
FIVE FUNCTIONS:

ONE, TO ADVISE THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL--
AND OF COURSE THE PRESIDENT--ON INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY;

TWO, TO SUPPORT AND ADVISE THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL IN THE COORDINATION OF ALL FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF OUR GOVERNMENT;

THREE, TO PRODUCE AND DISSEMINATE FINISHED
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT;

FOUR, TO PROVIDE THOSE SERVICES OF COMMON
CONCERN FOR INTELLIGENCE WHICH CAN BEST BE UNDERTAKEN
CENTRALLY; AND

FIVE, TO PERFORM SUCH OTHER SERVICES AS THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MAY DIRECT.

FIVE PRESIDENTS AND 24 YEARS LATER, THE LANGUAGE
OF THE STATUTE REQUIRES A COUPLE OF BRIEF
FOOTNOTES.

FOR ONE THING, IT IS OFTEN STATED THAT THE
CIA WAS CREATED TO COORDINATE THE INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT. STRICTLY SPEAKING,
THIS IS NOT CORRECT. THE ACT OF 1947 DIRECTED THE
CIA TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY

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COUNCIL ON COORDINATION; THE CIA RECOMMENDED, AND THE NSC ORDERED, THAT THIS COORDINATION WOULD BE EFFECTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE INDIVIDUALLY, AS THE PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. THIS THE DIRECTOR DOES, TO A LARGE EXTENT THROUGH THE USIB MACHINERY. TO DEAL WITH ANOTHER ASPECT OF COORDINATION--THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCES--IN 1968 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ESTABLISHED A THREE-MAN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES BOARD, CHAIRED BY THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. HITHERTO, ITS OTHER MEMBERS HAVE BEEN THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ADMINISTRATION (WHO HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE) AND THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, REPRESENTING THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. IT HAS RECENTLY BEEN ANNOUNCED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THAT THE POSITION OF AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE WILL BE ESTABLISHED TO COORDINATE, AT A MORE SENIOR LEVEL, THE VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WITHIN DOD. THIS NEW ASSISTANT SECRETARY MAY BECOME THE DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE ON NIRB.

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NIRB WAS ESTABLISHED AT THE BEGINNING OF A PERIOD WHEN INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS WERE GROWING AND THE RESOURCES TO DEAL WITH THEM SHRINKING AT THE SAME RATHER UNCOMFORTABLE PACE. THIS BOARD HAS THE DIFFICULT TASK OF MATCHING RESPONSIBILITIES WITH ASSETS AND TRYING TO DO SO ON THE MOST COST EFFECTIVE BASIS. THE BOARD MAKES RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, AS WELL AS TO THE PROPER AUTHORITIES AT DEFENSE AND STATE, ON THE MOST EFFICIENT METHODS OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.

FINALLY, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE HAS A SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WITH A SMALL BUT EXPERIENCED STAFF WITHIN CIA, ASSIGNED TO CONTINUING REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE MAJOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS. SO MUCH FOR THE MACHINERY OF COORDINATION.

THE SECOND FOOTNOTE CONCERNS STATUTORY THEORY AND PRACTICE. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 PLACES THE CIA DIRECTLY UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WAS CREATED BY STATUTE; IT IS LISTED IN THE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUALS; AND A SUCCESSION OF STATUTES HAS SPECIFIED ITS MEMBERSHIP.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ATTENDS AS AN OBSERVER AND ADVISOR, NOT AS A MEMBER.

THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT SUCCESSIVE PRESIDENTS HAVE DIFFERED IN THEIR USE OF THE NSC--DIFFERED FROM EACH OTHER, AND EVEN CHANGED CONCEPTS WITHIN A PRESIDENTIAL TERM.

LEST ANYONE SHOULD ARGUE THAT THE CIA IS THEREFORE CONTROLLED ONLY BY A SOMETIMES INACTIVE OR DORMANT BODY, LET ME STATE THAT WHETHER THE STATUTORY NSC WAS MEETING DAILY, WEEKLY, OR INFREQUENTLY, UNDER ANY GIVEN ADMINISTRATION, EACH PRESIDENT HAS HAD CONTINUING MACHINERY WITHIN HIS CABINET OR HIS WHITE HOUSE STAFF TO DEAL WITH NSC QUESTIONS, AND THESE QUESTIONS HAVE INCLUDED CONTINUING CONTROL OVER THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

WITH THESE TWO FOOTNOTES, LET US LOOK AT THE ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF CIA ITSELF.

THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY CIA FALL INTO THREE BROAD CATEGORIES:

COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE;

PRODUCTION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE; AND

COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS.

WE FIND IT CONVENIENT TO DIVIDE CIA'S INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES INTO THREE GROUPINGS

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THAT REFLECT DIFFERENT MEANS OF ACQUISITION. THE FIRST IS OVERT COLLECTION WHICH, AS THE NAME SUGGESTS, COVERS INFORMATION SECURED BY OPEN OR NON-CLANDESTINE MEANS. OVERT COLLECTION INCLUDES THE MONITORING OF FOREIGN RADIOS, SUCH AS RADIO MOSCOW, RADIO PEKING, [REDACTED]

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THIS IS DONE BY THE FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, [REDACTED]

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THE NEXT PRIMARY MISSION OF CIA IS TO PRODUCE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND TO PROVIDE FOR ITS DISSEMINATION.

THIS INCLUDES BOTH INTELLIGENCE ANALYSES PREPARED SOLELY WITHIN CIA AND OTHERS PRODUCED WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, WHICH I MENTIONED EARLIER, ARE OF THE LATTER TYPE.

ANOTHER CATEGORY OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE IS CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, SOME OF WHICH IS PRODUCED IN CONSULTATION WITH DIA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH. AS WITH THE NIEs, THIS COMBINED PRODUCT WE CALL "NATIONAL" INTELLIGENCE. MOST OF YOU ARE PROBABLY FAMILIAR WITH CURRENT INTELLIGENCE. IT IS DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT THE DECISION

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MAKER IS WELL INFORMED ON THE BASIS OF THE LATEST AVAILABLE INFORMATION FROM ALL SOURCES, ON SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS WHICH MAY AFFECT THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. IT IS ALSO DESIGNED TO ALERT THE POLICY-MAKER TO AN INCIPIENT CRISIS. CIA MAINTAINS AN OPERATIONS CENTER WHICH IS MANNED AROUND THE CLOCK SEVEN DAYS A WEEK. THIS MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO ALERT OUR PEOPLE TO PRODUCE SPOT CURRENT INTELLIGENCE OR TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION ON A 24-HOUR BASIS IN CRITICAL SITUATIONS. THE OPERATIONS CENTER IS ALSO CONNECTED BY RAPID AND SECURE COMMUNICATIONS TO THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER AND THE NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER IN THE PENTAGON, THE STATE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS CENTER AND THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE HAS OFTEN BEEN COMPARED TO A NEWSPAPER. I BELIEVE THERE IS ONE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE. CIA'S CURRENT INTELLIGENCE IS PRODUCED BY A GROUP OF ANALYSTS WHO ARE EXPERTS IN THEIR FIELDS AND WHO HAVE ALL SOURCES OF INFORMATION OPEN TO THEM, INCLUDING EXPERTS IN SPECIALIZED DISCIPLINES SUCH AS ECONOMICS, FOREIGN TRADE, OR TECHNICAL WEAPONS DEVELOPMENTS. CIA'S CURRENT INTELLIGENCE IS

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DISSEMINATED IN DAILY AND WEEKLY PUBLICATIONS, SPECIAL MEMORANDA, AND SITUATION REPORTS ON CRISIS TOPICS. SPECIAL ALL-SOURCE PUBLICATIONS ARE PREPARED FOR THE PRESIDENT AND HIS SENIOR POLICY-MAKING ADVISORS.

ANOTHER TYPE OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION COM-
PRISES THE RESEARCH STUDY. THESE STUDIES COVER A
WIDE VARIETY OF TOPICS--FOR EXAMPLE, AN ANALYSIS OF
THE VARIOUS SECTORS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY, THE OIL
INDUSTRY IN IRAN, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THE STUDIES ARE OFTEN PRODUCED IN RESPONSE
TO SPECIFIC REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE, THE SEC-
RETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE, OR THEIR SENIOR OFFI-
CERS.

FINALLY, OUR PRODUCTION INCLUDES WHAT WE CALL
BASIC INTELLIGENCE. THIS IS A DURABLE TYPE OF BREAD-
AND-BUTTER FACT YOU FIND IN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
SURVEY--THE RAILROAD SYSTEM, THE CAPACITY OF THE PORTS,
THE POLICE MACHINERY, THE MILITARY FORCES OF A PAR-
TICULAR COUNTRY. AS THE NAME IMPLIES, THE NIS IS
THE RESULT OF A WIDE COLLABORATION OF DIFFERENT PARTS
OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

YOU WILL RECALL THAT THE FIFTH FUNCTION ASSIGNED
TO CIA WAS TO PERFORM SUCH OTHER SERVICES AS THE

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MAY DIRECT. THIS IS OUR CHARTER FOR COVERT ACTIONS, THE THIRD GENERAL CATEGORY OF CIA ACTIVITIES.

IN PURSUING ITS INTERESTS IN THE REAL WORLD THE UNITED STATES IS AT TIMES CONFRONTED BY FOREIGN ADVERSARIES ADEPT AT CONSPIRACY AND SUBVERSION, WITH WORLD-WIDE CLANDESTINE ASSETS, SKILLED AGENTS, AND NO COMPUNCTION ABOUT UNDERMINING INTERESTS THAT THE U.S. POLICY-MAKERS MAY WISH TO PROTECT.

THERE ARE APT TO BE OCCASIONS WHEN IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE UNITED STATES, IN ORDER TO COUNTER THESE COMMUNIST EFFORTS, TO HAVE ITS OWN CAPABILITY TO RESPOND BY COVERT OR CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

THIS IS THE CATEGORY OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS THAT CONGRESS HAD IN MIND WHEN IT DIRECTED CIA TO PERFORM "SUCH OTHER SERVICES" AS THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT DIRECT.

OUR CRITICS WOULD HAVE YOU BELIEVE THAT EVER SINCE CONGRESS GAVE THIS AUTHORITY IN 1947, CIA HAS DONE AS IT PLEASED, WITHOUT REGARD TO OFFICIAL POLICIES OR OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AND SOMETIMES IN DIAMETRIC OPPOSITION TO THOSE POLICIES.

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
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WHENEVER THE CIA CARRIES OUT A COVERT OPERATION OVERSEAS, IT IS WITH THE PRIOR APPROVAL OF A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

EACH COVERT OPERATION WHICH THE AGENCY PROPOSES TO CONDUCT OVERSEAS, WHETHER IT IS POLITICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, OR PARAMILITARY, IS PRESENTED TO THIS COMMITTEE. IT EITHER WINS THE APPROVAL OF THE COMMITTEE, OR IT DOES NOT TAKE PLACE.

WHEN COVERT OPERATIONS ARE APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THESE OPERATIONS ARE NOT GOING TO BE CONTRARY TO--OR OUTSIDE OF--THE GUIDELINES ESTABLISHED BY UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY.

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OUR UNDERTAKINGS MUST ALSO HAVE THE APPROVAL OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. CERTAIN

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OFFICIALS OF THAT OFFICE HAVE BEEN GIVEN FULL CLEAR-
ANCE TO INQUIRE INTO ALL OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN DETAIL--AND BELIEVE
ME, THEY MAKE FULL USE OF THAT AUTHORITY.

IN ADDITION TO SUCH PRIOR APPROVALS, THERE ARE
OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WHICH HAVE
THE SAME FULL CLEARANCE TO MONITOR OUR CONTINUING
OPERATIONS, AND CONDUCT POST-MORTEMS ON THOSE WHICH
HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.

SOME OF THESE HAVE BEEN AD HOC GROUPS APPOINTED
BY PAST PRESIDENTS--SUCH AS THE CLARK COMMITTEE, THE
DOOLITTLE COMMITTEE, AND THE HOOVER COMMISSION TASK
FORCES.

ON A PERMANENT BASIS, ALL OF THE INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ARE UNDER THE
CONTINUING SCRUTINY OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN IN-
TELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD. THIS BOARD WAS FORMED
IN JANUARY 1956, UNDER DR. JAMES KILLIAN OF M.I.T.
IT IS NOW HEADED BY RETIRED ADMIRAL GEORGE W.
ANDERSON. IT IS A VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE ASSEMBLAGE OF
DISTINGUISHED PRIVATE CITIZENS, APPOINTED BY AND
REPORTING TO THE PRESIDENT. IT MEETS FOR A COUPLE
OF DAYS EVERY TWO MONTHS TO EXAMINE--IN DEPTH AND

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IN DETAIL--THE WORK, THE PROGRESS, AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE ENTIRE U.S. INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM. BETWEEN REGULAR MEETINGS, SUBCOMMITTEES CARRY ON CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS OF OUR SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN INTELLIGENCE.

OVER THE YEARS, THE BOARD MEMBERSHIP HAS NORMALLY BEEN A MIXTURE OF RETIRED SENIOR OFFICERS FROM BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN BRANCHES OF THE GOVERNMENT, FIGURES FROM THE ACADEMIC WORLD, AND PROMINENT LEADERS IN BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY.

THE PRESENT BOARD INCLUDES GOVERNOR NELSON ROCKEFELLER; AMBASSADOR ROBERT MURPHY, THE FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE; MR. FRANK PACE, JR., FORMER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY AND DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET; MR. GORDON GRAY, WHO WAS PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; DR. WILLIAM O. BAKER OF BELL TELEPHONE LABORATORIES; DR. EDWIN LAND, HEAD OF POLAROID; DR. FRANKLIN D. MURPHY, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF THE LOS ANGELES TIMES-MIRROR; AND MR. FRANKLIN B. LINCOLN, JR., OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S LAW FIRM OF MUDGE, ROSE, GUTHRIE & ALEXANDER; AND DR. EDWARD TELLER, NUCLEAR PHYSICIST.

WE ARE NOT ONLY UNDER EFFECTIVE CONTROL BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WE ARE ALSO UNDER THE CONTINUING

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SCRUTINY OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH.

EVER SINCE CIA WAS FIRST ESTABLISHED, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE PRESIDENT, AND IN FACT INSTRUCTED, TO MAKE COMPLETE DISCLOSURE OF CIA ACTIVITIES TO SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEES IN BOTH THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

THE CONGRESS HAS CREATED SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES IN BOTH THE HOUSE AND SENATE TO HEAR THESE REPORTS.

ALSO, AS YOU MAY HAVE SURMISED FROM MY REFERENCES TO THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, OUR OPERATIONS REQUIRE MONEY. OUR HEADQUARTERS ARE IN LANGLEY, VIRGINIA, NOT AT FORT KNOX, AND OUR APPROPRIATIONS REQUESTS ARE DISCUSSED IN FULL WITH SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEES OF SENATE AND HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS.

SOME OF THE CONFUSION OVER CIA'S RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS ARISES FROM THE FACT THAT THESE FOUR SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEES, AND ONLY THESE--ABOUT 30 LEGISLATORS IN ALL--HAVE BEEN CLEARED BY THE PRESIDENT TO INQUIRE IN DETAIL INTO OUR ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS.

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WE WILL, OF COURSE, BRIEF ANY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE HAVING A JURISDICTIONAL INTEREST IN OUR SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD. IN THE COURSE OF A YEAR, THERE MAY BE 20 OR 30 SUCH COMMITTEE HEARINGS--AND SOME OF THEM RUN AS LONG AS THREE FULL DAYS. WE ALSO BRIEF INDIVIDUAL CONGRESSMEN FREQUENTLY AT THEIR REQUEST.

BUT DISCUSSION OF CIA ACTIVITIES, METHODS, AND SOURCES IS ANOTHER MATTER. IT INVOLVES THE LIVES OF PEOPLE WHO WORK WITH US, AND THE EFFICACY OF OUR METHODS. THESE MATTERS ARE DISCUSSED ONLY WITH THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEES DESIGNATED FOR THESE PURPOSES. THIS IS NOT ARBITRARY OR BUREAUCRATIC; IT IS SIMPLY RECOGNITION THAT THE RISK OF INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE RISES WITH THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE ACCESS TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION OF THIS TYPE.

WHERE DISCLOSURE IS AUTHORIZED, IT IS COMPLETE. WITH THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEES, WE DISCUSS COVERT OPERATIONAL MATTERS AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS WHICH ARE SO SENSITIVE THAT EVEN WITHIN CIA ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF OUR PERSONNEL ARE AUTHORIZED TO BE INFORMED.

I AM HAPPY TO SAY THAT THE MEMBERS OF THESE SUBCOMMITTEES, OVER THE YEARS, HAVE ESTABLISHED AN

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ENVIABLE SECURITY RECORD, AND HAVE REPAID OUR CANDOR WITH CONSTRUCTIVE AND WELCOME SUPPORT. ACCORDINGLY, I CAN PERCEIVE NO CAUSE FOR TERROR IN THE SUGGESTION THAT WE SHOULD REPORT TO WHAT THE PRESS LIKES TO CALL A "JOINT WATCHDOG COMMITTEE." WE ALREADY DO.

SO MUCH, THEN, FOR THE CHARGE THAT CIA IS UNDER NO CONTROLS, AND THAT NOBODY IN WASHINGTON IS TOLD WHAT CIA IS DOING.

AS FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, CIA IS DIVIDED INTO FOUR PRINCIPAL GROUPINGS--REFERRED TO AS DIRECTORATES--AND SEVERAL STAFF OR SPECIAL FUNCTIONS, THE HEADS OF WHICH REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE DIRECTOR. AN EXAMPLE OF THE LATTER IS THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES WHICH I REFERRED TO EARLIER.

NOW FOR THE DIRECTORATES, THE DDI, OR INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE, IS THE PRINCIPAL PRODUCER OF FINISHED SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE. THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE ALSO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.

THE NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER, WHICH I REFERRED TO EARLIER, IS ADMINISTERED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE IN CLOSE COLLABORATION

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WITH THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND IS JOINTLY STAFFED BY THE TWO AGENCIES. AS THE NAME SUGGESTS, THE NPIC EXAMINES FILMS IN DETAIL AND ANALYZES AND INTERPRETS THE PHOTOGRAPHY AND OTHER IMAGERY. THE WORK OF THE NPIC FEEDS INTO AND SUPPORTS INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY.

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THE DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AS THE NAME SUGGESTS, CONCENTRATES ON THE SCIENTIFIC

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AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF OUR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING R&D FOR TECHNICAL COLLECTION OPERATIONS AND THE PRODUCTION OF SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE ON THE S&T CAPABILITIES OF FOREIGN NATIONS. THIS DIRECTORATE ALSO HOUSES OUR CENTRAL ELECTRONIC COMPUTER CENTER.

THE FOURTH DIRECTORATE IS THE SUPPORT DIRECTORATE, WHICH EMBRACES THE SUPPORT SERVICES, SUCH AS SECURITY, COMMUNICATIONS, TRAINING, PERSONNEL, FINANCE, LOGISTICS, PRINTING AND THE HOUSEKEEPING FUNCTIONS.

FINALLY, IF I MAY, I WANT TO DEVOTE A FEW MOMENTS TO THE TYPES OF PEOPLE WHO WORK FOR THE CIA.

THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT JAMES BOND AND HIS COLLEAGUES OF THE SPY MOVIES AND NOVELS NEVER WORKED THERE.

THE CIA EMPLOYEE IS A MUCH MORE ACADEMIC MAN THAN THE PUBLIC REALIZES. WE HAVE MORE THAN 800 SENIOR PROFESSIONALS WITH 20 YEARS OR MORE OF INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUND. MORE THAN HALF OF OUR OFFICERS SPEAK AT LEAST ONE FOREIGN LANGUAGE. SOME 17 PERCENT HAVE GRADUATE DEGREES. SIX OUT OF EVERY 10 OF THE ANALYSTS WHO HAVE DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY AT HEAD-QUARTERS FOR ANALYSIS OF A FOREIGN AREA HAD LIVED, WORKED, OR TRAVELED ABROAD IN THAT AREA EVEN BEFORE THEY CAME TO CIA.

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WHEN YOU COMBINE ALL OF THE YEARS REQUIRED FOR GRADUATE STUDY, FOREIGN EXPERIENCE, AND THEN ADD 10 TO 15 YEARS OF INTELLIGENCE WORK, IT AMOUNTS TO AN IMPRESSIVE DEPTH OF KNOWLEDGE, COMPETENCE, AND EXPERTISE AT THE SERVICE OF OUR GOVERNMENT.

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